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IN THE SUPREME COURT
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UNION, a corporation,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No.

v.

AGAPITO ESPINOZA and
MARY ESPINOZA,
Defendants/Appellant.

BRIEF OF
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OiF .
JUDICIAL DISTRICT C00,11.T
COUNTY, THE HONORAEmE'
PRESID~NG.

TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN, ESQ.
Attorney for Respondent
2605 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah
84401
Attorney for Respondent
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the
District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 10, 1972, Defendants signed a Promissory
Note and Security Agreement with Plaintiff in the amount of
$4,527.38.

Defendants pledged various exempt household

goods as security for the loan including a refrigerator,
electric range, washer, dinette set, and the family's beds.
No explanation of the exemption laws of the State of Utah
was given by any of the employees of Plaintiff nor were
Defendants aware of such laws.

Defendants subsequently

defaulted and Plaintiff sought to foreclose the security
interest.

Defendant Mary Espinoza raised the issue of

unconscionability under U.C.A. §70B-5-108 with regard to the
taking of a security interest in exempt property and trial
on this issue

W"l.S

held on July 20, 1979, before the Honorable

Ronald O. Hyde.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE GRANTHJG OF A SECURITY INTEREST IN
STATUTORILY EXEMPT PROPERTY IS A WAIVER
OF A RIGHT AND AS SUCH MUST BE KNOWINGLY
AND INTENTIONALLY MADE.
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As security for the loan involved here Defendants
pledged the following items of property:

refrigerator,

electric range, washing machine, dinette set with chairs,
couch, recliner, rocker, stereo, television, two rugs, bunk
beds, two chests of drawers, bedroom set, rifle, tent,
sewing machine, two end tables, ceramic lamp, a 1967 pickup
truck with camper shell and a 1964 Chevrolet station wagon.
Most, if not all of the household goods would fall within
the meaning of U.C.A. §78-23-1:
The following property is exempt from execution
except as herein otherwise specially provided,
and except as provided in the Utah Uniform
Concumer Credit Code relating to certain consumer
transactions:
(1)
Chairs, tables, and desks ... ;
(2)
Necessary household, table and kitchen
furniture belonging to the judgment debtor .•..
This Court has held that a valid security interest
may be created in

exe~pt

v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622

property.

Clearfield State Bank

(Utah 1977).

It matters not that the property may be
subject of such an exemption [Under U.C.A.
§78-23-1) .... The owner thereof may nevertheless sell or alienate his property of
that nature, or any interest that he may
have therein.
The Contos holding is consistent with the general
rule that a debtor may pledge exempt property, thereby
waiving the exemption.

The mortgaging of the property is
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considered an implied waiver.
Transactions §562;
However,

See 69 Am. Jur. 2d Secured

31 Am. Jur. 2d Exemptions §159.
in order for a waiver, express or implied,

to be valid, it must be a "voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known legal right."

Schwab Safe & Lock co.

v. Snow, 47 Utah 199, 152 P. 171, 176 (1915).
involved a waiver in a contract setting.
was reaffirmed in O'Donnell v. Parker,
1192 (1916)

That case

This definition

48 Utah 578, 160 P.

(waiving statute of limitations) and in Wooley

v. Loose, 57 Utah 336, 194 P. 908

(1920)

(waiving statute of

frauds).

The present Utah law concerning waiver is stated
in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d
308, 311-2 (1936).

"A waiver is the intentional relinquish-

ment of a known right.

To constitute a waiver, there must

be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of
its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.

It must

be distinctly made, although it may be express or implied."
(insurance context).
Savings

&

This analysis was followed in American

Loan Association v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445

P.2d 1, 3 (1968) (mortgagee's right to accelerate debt);
Bjork'!....:.._ April Industries, Inc.,
1976)

547 P.2d 219, 220 (Utah

(right to have shares registered).
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No waiver was found by this court in any of these
cases.

This analysis is consistent with decisions of the

United States Supreme Court on the question of waiver in
other contexts.

That court has also repeatedly held that a

waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right.
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937) (right to
counsel)
Comm.,

and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities
301 U.S. 292, 306-7 (1937) (right to appropriate

valuation of utility property).
In the present context this court should likewise
hold that no waiver of rights has occured since the Defendants
were never informed of their exemption rights and thus could
not have knowi· 1gly waived them.

This Court should follow

the analysis recently utilized by courts in Louisiana and
Pennsylvania in dealing with very similar fact situations.
In Aetna Finance Company v. Antoine , 343 So.2d
1195

(La. App. 1977), the court held that debtors who had

executed a chattel mortgage on household furnishings had
thereby granted an implied waiver of their right to assert
the relevant statutory exemptions.

But the court went on to

hold that the debtors were not foreclosed from attacking the
validity of the waiver on the grounds that the waiver of the
exemption had not been knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
made.

After discussing the policy issues involved the court

stated:
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Notwithstanding the fact that a person
executing a chattel mortgage knew, presumably, that he was in fact granting a
chattel mortgage on the movable property,
he is not presumed to know the effect of
a chattel mortgage on the exemption.
Accordingly, we hold that the irrebuttable
presumption does not exist, and a debtor is
not foreclosed from attacking the validity
of the waiver under circumstances where
the debtor shows the waiver was not knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently made.
Id. at 1198.
(Emphasis added)
This conclusion was reached after an analysis by
the court that to consider the signing of the note as an
irrebuttable presumption of waiver
would result in a foreclosure ... of the
right of a debtor to attack the validity
of a waiver under circumstances, where
for one of many reasons, a debtor is not
aware of the effect of the chattel
mortgage on the exemption.
Id.
The Louisiana court echoes the past decisions of this court
in indicating its reluctance to find a waiver except in
"exceptional cases."
Similarly, in Transnational Consumer Discount
Company v. Kefauver, 307 A.2d 303 (Pa. Super. 1973), the
debtors had signed a judgment note and security agreement
which stated that the signers "waive all relief from all
appraisement and exemption laws of any State now in force or
hereafter to be passed".

Upon default and judgment the

Sheriff levied upon household goods covered by the security
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agreement.

The lower court accepted the debtor's testimony

that they did not know they had an exemption to waive but
nevertheless found the waiver valid relying on older Pennsylvania case law.

The lower court stated:

The waiver is here stated on the face of
the note and in standard type and was not
buried in fine print .... It is clear from
the deposition of the parties that defendants
had an ample opportunity to read the loan
documents and that the plaintiff was not
guilty of any misconduct or misrepresentation.
Defendants were in general aware of the terms
of their loan and recognized that their furniture could be taken in the event of their
default....
Id. at 304.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania overturned the
lower court's decision and overruled the older case law,
stating that no waiver may be found unless it is also found
that the debtor has voluntarily relinquished a right he
knows he has.

"Since in the present case the lower court

found that appellants did not know of their right to the
$300 exemption, the court should have found no waiver of
that right and so should have granted the petition to stay
execution."
v. Lennox,

Id. at 305.

The court relied in part on Swarb

314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970) which had dealt

with the validity of confessions of judgment contained in
contracts or leases.

There the court found that there had

not been an intentional waiver as the debtors did not fully
understand the rights which they were relinquishing by
signing the notes.
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The Kefauver court also held that the fact that
the right waived was statutory rather than constitutional
was immaterial and that knowledge of the right was required
for a valid waiver thereof.
In the present case the evidence is undisputed
that Plaintiff never explained the exemption laws of Utah to
Defendants.

See Plaintiff's Answers to First Set of In-

terrogatories P.6.

Nowhere on the face of either the

Security Agreement or the Disclosure Form which Plaintiff
provided and which Defendants signed is there any mention of
Defendant's statutory exemption rights.

Clearly Defendants

did not make a knowing waiver of their rights, thus no
waiver exists and Defendants should be allowed to claim
their statutory exemption.
POINT II
TAKING A NONPURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY
INTEREST IN EXEMPT HOUSEHOLD FURNISHINGS WITHOUT DISCLOSING EXEMPTION
RIGHTS IS UNCONSCIONABLE UNDER U.C.A.
§70B-5-108.
This Court's equitable jurisdiction is invoked in
this appeal both through constitutional directive and through
Defendant's claim of unconscionability under U.C.A. §70B-5-iOo
See Powell v. Bastian, 541 P. 2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1975) (Maughan,

-8-
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QB.

an,

J. dissenting).

The concept of unconscionability is im-

precise and is always subject to the specific facts of a
given case.

Courts have, however, indicated certain factors

which may be indicators of an unconscionable contract:

the

denial of basic rights and remedies to a buyer of consumer
goods, the inclusion of penalty clauses, the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the contract, an imbalance in
the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain, exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisticated, uneducated and
illiterate, and inequality of bargaining or economic power.
See Willie v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 549 P.2d
903, 907 (Kan. 1976).
The taking of nonpurchase-money security interests
in exempt household goods has been widely condemned as
against public policy and unconscionable.

Two recent federal

actions and a variety of state responses to the problem
indicate the seriousness and possible remedies.

The Federal

Trade Commission recently released its Presiding Officer's
Report on Proposed Trade Regulation Rule: Credit Practices
(16 C.F.R. Part 444) Public Record No. 215-42, Issued August
1978

(hereinafter Report) .

The FTC considered various

credit practices for over three years and heard testimony
from various persons representing all aspects of the credit
industry as well as consumers.

The Report reached the

following conclusions:
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a.
Security interests in household goods
[2 (a) (4)].
Section 2 (a) (4) of the proposed
rule is intended to prevent the taking of a
non-purchase money blanket security interest
in all of the household goods of a debtor to
secure payment of either a personal loan or
the purchase price of consumer goods or services
it can be stated categorically that such provisions are used in a majority of consumer
credit contracts of finance companies and in
many of the contracts of retailers, banks, and
credit unions.
Although the taking of non-purchase money
security interests in household goods is
commonplace in almost every state where
such a security interest is permitted, and
it _s permitted in virtually all of the
states, actual repossession of household
goods following a default is a relatively
infrequent occurrence ....
The relatively low rate of repossessions
supports a finding that the primary purpose
or creditor benefit in taking security
interests in household goods is the utility
of this form of collateral in impressing
upon the consumer the necessity for making
timely payments on the obligation and to
provide the creditor with an effective means
of curing defaults.
The record supports a finding that security
interests in household goods are susceptible
to misuse and abuse by creditors to obtain
payment from debtors who are actually in no
position, regardless of the cause, to make
those payments.
There is no doubt that in
terrorem use of the remedy in the form of
threats to repossess can and does result
in emotional suffering, humiliation, anxiety,
leading in extreme cases to mental and physical
breakdowns, and considerable harm to the family
relationships.
At least with respect to low-income consumers the record shows that household goods,
as a whole, have little actual market value;
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and this value is not a significant consideration in determining whether or not to grant a
loan or in determining the amount of the loan.
It is probably more likely that the loan will
be under-secured than that the value of the
household goods will exceed the amount of the
loan.
Creditors, as a group, are far more
interested in being repaid than in obtaining a
right to seize the property. To a consumer
the sentimental psychological value of the
household goods exceeds the actual cash value.
However, most consumers recognize that the
replacement cost of this type of property is
far greater than the amount owed on the secured
loan.
For all of these reasons low-income
consumers are most anxious to avoid repossession and are peculiarly vulnerable to threats
of repossession.
In the face of such threats
they may well fail to assert valid or meritorious defenses.
The evidence, at least as far as the
low-income or poor consumer is concerned,
supports a finding and the accompanying conclusion that a grant of a non-purchase money
security interest in household goods has the
potential and will, in many cases, result in
injury far greater than any benefits to be
gained through the use of the credit thereby
obtained . . . .
(Emphasis added) pp. 160-162.
The FTC rule would greatly restrict the taking of nonpurchasemoney security interests in household goods due to the
severe repercussions caused to the family by later attempts
to repossess the property.
In response to the same problem, Congress recently
enacted a greatly revised Bankruptcy Act, P.L. 95-598,
Approved November 6, 1978.

11 U.S.C. §522(e) and (f) state
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that a waiver of exemptions in favor of a creditor on an
unsecured claim involving exempt property is unenforceable
and that a debtor may avoid any lien granted as a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in household
goods which impairs the debtor's exemption rights to those
goods.

That Congress recognized the specific practice under

consideration here as unconscionable is clear from the
legislative history of the new act:
The second right [to avoid security
interests] will be of more significance
for the average consumer debtor.
Frequently, creditors lending money to a
consumer debtor take a security interest
in all of the debtor's belongings, and
obtain a waiver by the debtor of his exemptions.
In most of these cases, the debtor
is unaware of the consequences of the forms
he signs.
The creditor's experience provides him with a substantial advantage.
If
the debtor encounters financial difficulty,
creditors often use threats of repossession
of all of the debtor's household goods as a
means of obtaining payment.
In fact, were the creditor to carry
through on his threat and foreclose on the
property, he would receive little, for
household goods have little resale value.
They are far QOre valuable to the creditor
in the debtor's hands, for they provide a
credible basis for the threat, because the
replacement costs of the goods are generally
high.
Thus, creditors rarely repossess, and
debtors, ignorant of the creditors' true
intentions, are coerced into payments they
simply cannot afford to make.
The exemption provision allows the debtor,
after bankruptcy has been filed, and creditor
collection techniques have been stayed, to
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undu the consequences of a contract of adhesion
signed in ignorance, by permitting the invalida~
tion of nonpurchase money security interests
in household goods.
Such security interests
have.too often been used by over-reaching
creditors.
The bill eliminates any unfair
advantage creditors have.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 2nd Sess.
127.
At least four states have legislatively reached
the same conclusion and expressly invalidate waivers of the
exemption of household goods.

See Vukowich, Debtors'

Exemption Rights 62 Geo.L.J. 779 at 849 (1974).
It has been argued that to invalidate any contractual
agreement which may result in the loss of property necessary
to survive is to restrict the freedom of the owners of that
property.

While this is true to some extent, public policy

requires that some property be protected for debtors.

One

commentator suggests:
... To accommodate these interests, permitting
waivers of exemptions and security interests
in the more substantial exempt assets-such
as the homestead and insurance-is reasonable,
but waivers and security interests which
affect exempt property which provide immediate
support and maintenance-such as wages, household goods, tools of the trade, and clothingshould not be allowed . . . . The policy is sound,
since it permits persons to use the more substantial assets as collateral; in fact, these
are the types of assets which represent the
best collateral and which are most commonly
used as such.
To some extent, the denial of
the right to waive exemptions and grant
security interests in other assets would infringe upon persons' rights to obtain
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credit.
However, the infringement is not
very great and the benefits of the policy
of protection of the debtor and his family
outweigh the losses occasioned by this infriP jement.
Id at 852.
The disparate bargaining position of the creditor
here and the use of the security interest in household goods
primarily as a threat to collect the debt can be seen from
the Plaintiff's Answers to First Set of Interrogatories.
The Credit Union admits that the indications of ability to
repay that were requested all concerned Defendants' income
and past payment history and no mention is made of the
of the goods taken as security.

val~

Furthermore, the total

value of all the exempt household goods is listed by Plaintif'.
at $791. 00 and the total value of all collateral is $2, 691.00
to secure a note of $4,527.38.

Clearly the loan could have

been arranged without the exempt goods which contributed
less than one-third of the total value of the security.

A

loan in some amount could have been arranged and the public
policy of preventing total destitution would have been
supported.

As written in the agreement, after foreclosure

this family will be unable to feed itself at home and all
family members will have to sleep on bare floors since even
the carpets will be sold.
result to take place.

Public policy must not allow this

This is particularly true in the

present context where there is no indication whatsoever that
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DLlfcndants were aware of the consequences of their signing
the security agreement - that the family had given up their
legal rights to the minimum necessities of life.
CONCLUSION
It appears quite clear that no explanation of
debtors'

exemption rights was made in this case.

Since the

policy of most courts, including that of this court, is that
a waiver of such rights may only be made knowingly and
voluntarily, no valid waiver could have occurred here.

In

the alternative, this Court should find that the taking of
a security interest in such exempt property is invalid as an
unconscionable act under U.C.A. §70B-5-108 and not allow
Plaintiff to foreclose their security interest in the
exempt property, or in the alternative, set aside any
balance due and owing on the note.

Respectful~y submitted this

~

Z__

day of March, 1979.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant
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